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Younger: Introduction

HOFSTPA IAW REVIEW
Volume 12, No. 2

Winter 1984

SYMPOSIUM: THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
Irving Younger*
Perhaps least among the lesser arts is the art of introducing a
law review symposium. The introducer should give no offense, which
admonition brings one very nearly to the bottom of the subject. Between the exercise in undue proliferation, commanding the reader to
contemplate the paltriness of the symposiasts' efforts when compared
with those of the introduction's author, and the clipped salutation
which mocks the scholarly protraction it purports to praise, the civil
introducer must find a middle way.
No sooner said than done, when the symposium deals with the
Federal Rules of Evidence. In force now for almost a decade,' under
discussion for years before that,' the Rules are part of the common
mental stock of all federal litigators. With the Federal Rules of Civil
and of Criminal Procedure, they have become the context of every
federal lawsuit, the system of coordinates upon which lawyers measure and position their case.
Well, how fare they? Do the Federal Rules of Evidence work
well or poorly? Were the energies of those who conceived and nur* Member of the Bars of New York and of the District of Columbia, In 1984-85, holder
of the Marvin J. Sonosky Chair at the University of Minnesota Law School.
1. The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted on January 2, 1975, and became effective on July 1, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
2. See 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE vi-xi (1982).
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tured them wisely invested or foolishly spent? It begins to be time to
tell, although of course the next advance sheet may bring a decision
cancelling out even the most delicately considered assessment.
Four virtues mark a successful codification. The first is completeness. If a code treats part of a subject and leaves the remaining
part undisturbed, how can one justify codification at all? Surely a
codification ought to furnish answers to most and perhaps all the
questions likely to arise in connection with its matter. The second is
coherence. A codification should be so wrought that it supplies answers to a lawyer's questions simpler, more comprehensible, and
more easily found than those the lawyer could discover without the
codification. The third is courage. Every field of the law has its nettles, difficult problems hard to solve. A codification should grasp
every nettle, conceding that the problem is difficult, yes, but braving
a resolution one way or another, to the end that a lawyer know as
nearly as possible where he s stands. The fourth is correctness. A codification's position on controversial issues, its resolution of hard
problems, ought to be acknowledged by most lawyers as right, and if
not right then at least thoughtful.
When the Federal Rules of Evidence finally tumbled from the
printing press in 1975, they fell something short of a triumph of codification. They were deficient in three of the four necessary virtues.
First, the Rules are incomplete. They say nothing of substance
about privileges.4 They are silent on impeachment by eliciting bias,
prejudice, interest, or corruption. They make po mention in text of
judicial notice of legislative fact.0 The draftsmen had reasons for
these and other omissions, certainly, but omissions they remain, and
a lawyer bedevilled by a question involving one of the omitted subjects cannot help but wonder why there is all the fuss over a code of
federal evidence law so partially codified.
Second, the Rules are sometimes incoherent. Under rule 609,
exactly what impeachment is permissible of a mere witness as op3. This is the unmarked usage, a characteristic of most Indo-European languages.
Grammatically, the masculine gender denotes both male and female. See, e.g., A. Lincoln, The
Gettysburg Address in C. SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE PRAIIE YEARS AND THE
WAR YEARS (1954); Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF
POETRY 474 (rev. ed. 1975).
4. FED. R. EviD. 501 (the general rule on privileges directs reference to principles of

common law, or to state law if it supplies the rule of decision).
5.

See FED. R. EVID. 607, 608, 609, 610 and 613.

6. See FED. R. EvID. 201 advisory committee note.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol12/iss2/1

2

Younger: Introduction
1984]

INTRODUCTION

posed to the defendant in a criminal case?7 What precisely does
"character" mean as the word is used in the Rules and how does it
differ from "credibility?"" Is material upon which an expert properly
relies in formulating his9 opinion for that reason admissible and, if it
is, for what purpose? 10 To none of these important and troubling
questions do the Rules supply a plain answer. For answers of any
sort, a lawyer is relegated to the kind of research an uncodified subject requires, research complicated by the need to anatomize the
Rules and try to tease out of their halt and sometimes opaque
phrases an intention the very possibility of which, the lawyer will
inevitably suspect, never once occurred to those responsible for enacting them.
Third, in some respects, the Rules are uncourageous. They fail
to stake out a position on several of the principal controverted issues
in the law of evidence. In addition to the examples mentioned above
to illustrate the Rules' incompleteness, consider the question of the
effect (or lack of effect) of a presumption after it has shifted the
burden of going forward. Does it stay in the case and serve as some
evidence of the presumed fact? Or is it now gone, like the famous
bursting bubble of Thayer and Wigmore?" The interest of the question is as much practical 2 as theoretical, 3 yet the most attentive
reading of the Rules fails to yield an answer. 14 The nettle, alas, has
gone ungrasped.
About the fourth virtue, a somewhat cheerier tone becomes possible. While the Rules contain a provision or two that some might
argue to be not only dead wrong but also ill-informed,' 5 on the whole
and especially in Article 8, dealing with hearsay,"" the Rules inspire
7.

FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (begins by referring to "a witness," but goes on in its first

conditional clause to speak of "the defendant").
8.

For an extended treatment of this question, see Younger, Three Essays on Character

and Credibility Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 HoFSTRA L. REV. 7 (1976).
9. See supra note 3.
10. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
11. See J.THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW,
313, 336 (1898); 9 J.WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2491 (Chadbourn ed. 1981).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Hendrix, 542 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1976); People v. Silver, 33
N.Y.2d 475, 310 N.E.2d 520, 354 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1974).
13. See, e.g., Gausewitz, Presumptions,40 MINN. L. REV. 391 (1956).
14. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 301 ("a presumption imposes on the party against whom it
is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption but
does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which
remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast").
15. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 703 (Basis of Opinion Testimony by Experts).
16. In the writer's opinion, this is the Rules' most conspicuous success.
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in their user an agreeable confidence that what the Rules say is, for
the most part, right and, at a minimum, bespeaks careful study.
With one mark out of a possible four, the Rules would seem to
be something of a failure, and as an exhibition of the art of codification, fresh from the draftsmen's hand, they were. In 1984, however,
it would be unintelligent to think of the Rules as if they were brand
new, untempered by a decade's experience with them. So modulated,
so matured, one's judgment must be that the Rules are doing very
well indeed-not that their several deficiencies are to be ignored, but
that those deficiencies are outweighed by the Rules' one overriding
achievement.17 Their mere existence, however marred by correctible
imperfections, has brought about a new alertness to the recognition
of evidentiary problems and a more powerful ability to solve them.18
That there is a single (though flawed) document distilling the law of
evidence to be applied in federal lawsuits has converted the rules of
evidence, long regarded as a sort of fogbank to be gotten through
pretty much on instinct, into the Rules of Evidence, a difficult but
clearly lit landscape the successful traversal of which by lawyers and
judges should be a point of intellectual pride no less than of professional obligation. 19
The doubting reader might turn now to the articles that follow,
where he20 Will find immediate and ample proof of the remarkable
level of refinement to which the Federal Rules have brought the law
of evidence.

17. Some commentators point to the adoption of the Rules by many states as a salutory
development. Why? The prudence of uniformity of practice between federal and state courts is
hardly self-evident. And if the Rules were folly to begin with, their replication among the
states would not make them wise.
18. To avoid unnecessary contention, the writer concedes that he is unable to document
this assertion. It is not for that reason necessarily untrue.
19. A few splendid examples of judicial virtuosity in handling the Rules are United
States v. DiMaria, No. 83-1292 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 1983); Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
722 F.2d 1289 (6th Cir. 1983); Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607
(D. Alaska 1977).
20. See supra note 3.
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